(The following was filed for a Business Week story in January 1990.)

BCCI: Opening Day in Tampa Federal Court

By Bob Andelman

NOTES, OBSERVATIONS ON OPENING ARGUMENTS

The husbands of two of the jurors will apparently be attending most of the sessions. Judge Hodges said they were certainly welcome but strongly cautioned them about discussing the case with their wives, particularly anything that goes on in court when the jury is excused.

Judge apparently has a seating plan before him to keep track of the 14 lawyers he faces at seven tables. Can't tell the players without a scorecard. The tables themselves have cards tabled on them to instruct the lawyers as to where to sit.

Security is no different for this trial than any other. All visitors to the courthouse pass through an X-ray machine, as do their packages.

The hury is being provided individual blue, 3-ring notebooks for the trial to allow for note-taking during what is expected to be a 4-5 month proceeding. Also in the notebooks are court calendars - off-days are circled; a roster of the names of lawyers, defendents and other participants (name tags, they need name tags); a brief summary of the indictments and specifications as to which defendent is charged with which count; and a written account of the preliminary jury instructions given orally by Hodges. His first instruction was about an edition of PBS-TV's "Frontline." The Jan. 30 program featured a report on Noriega. "You should be careful NOT to watch," said Hodges.

In the front row of the gallery, a little Indian girl of no more than three years old lies face-up across her mother's lap, snoring peacefully while her daddy's trial begins.

All of the attorneys on both sides are men.

The jury consists of 8 women and 4 men; the six alternates are all men.

"Through a clerical error," Judge Hodges tells the jury, "there are two counts numbered as '18.'" So, it seems, there are actually 34 counts.

Before beginning his opening argument for the government, prosecutor Michael Rubenstein asked to approach the bench. Thirteen attorneys followed him. It looked like a football huddle. The same thing happens later when defense attorney John Hume approaches the judge.

At 10:06 a.m., the BCCI trial began in earnest with Rubenstein's opening statement. It lasted about 2 hours and 15 minutes and had to be concluded after lunch.

Rubenstein made a mostly chronological accounting of his case, beginning with Dominguez's collection in Detroit of suitcases full of $8-million in cash. "By the time he finished (10 trips total), he had a pile of suitcases this high," Rubenstein said, rising his arm above his head. It was the closest the prosecutor came to enhancing his otherwise dry monologue.

Rubenstein had the facts and told them in a straight-ahead manner; no embellishment. Very dull, no style. Quite bureaucratic. Exotic names and dates ran together, crossed and piled on top of one another.

He spoke of Hussain's advice to Musella with regarding to money laundering: "Don't write checks." He suggested buying CDs because they don't require the mailing of statements. And CDs could be used as collateral on loans, making funds available.

One day Hussain showed Mussella a copy of the St. Pete Times. He noted an article on the assasination of Colombian drug lord Rafael Cordova (sp?). Musella then told Hussain he'd make the following statement just one time: "This money comes from some of the largest drug dealers in South America." To which Hussain replied, "In that case, perhaps you want to put the money in Luxembourg."

It was the first of many points in which Rubenstein sought to make the point that Mussella informed virtually every party he did business with that his clients and his money were drug-related.

Rubenstein said that by 1988, BCCI had five offices in Medellin - equal to the number of offices it had in all of North America.

Jan. 1, 1988: Mussella told Awan his clients "are the biggest drug dealers in Columbia." Awan's response: "It's not any business of mine who your customers are."

Rubenstein's summed up BCCI's attitude this way: 1) "Where you get your customers is none of our business." 2) "BCCI will help clients preserve confidentiality any way it can." 3) "Please give us more deposits as soon as possible."

Rubenstein: "There will be no evidence of these bankers putting this money in their own pockets ... no kickbacks." He said they did what they did for their bank and for the advancement of their careers in the bank. "BCCI had a clear, well defined policy," said Rubenstein. "Take as many deposits as you can, as quick as you can, and don't ask any questions about from where they come." He said that increasing deposits was deemed to be the responsibility of everyone, "including the office boy."

"These are people interested in career advancement," said the prosecutor. "Their careers were more important than the laws of the United States."

The U.S. targeted Gonzalo Mora in C-Chase because he was "a small-time money launderer in need of help (who) didn't already have it all ... (Mora was) very ambitious, aggressive; anxious to accept the (government's) proposition."

Mora became Musella's unwitting partner and grew into a big-time launderer, making frequent trips to the U.S. with and to meet Mussella and Dominguez. Mora's job was to convert cocaine in usable products with no traceback: checks, bank drafts, credit in banks, bank transfers and usable cash.

Florida National Bank agreed to cooperate with the government and provide favorable credit information whenever inquiries were made on Mussella.

* Mora is supposed to explain his money laundering system via videotape later in the trial.

There were 148 face-to-face meetings involving Musella and the defendents between Dec. 86 and Oct. 88 and 2,000 recorded telephone calls. Rubenstein said it would take 390 hours to play all of the government's tape recordings.

Dominguez spoke only Spanish to Mora; Mora spoke no English. Musella spoke no Spanish. Dominguez was their interpreter.

When Steven Kalish testified before the Senate subcommittee on Jan 28 '88, several actions were set in motion. He said - according to Rubenstein - that he had personally bribed Noriega to use Panama as a base to launder money and he said he dealt personally with Awan.

On Feb. 2, Awan tells Mussella to be careful weith his Panamanian accounts; if too much pressure is brought to bear on the country, bank secrey may be compromised.

On March 28, Awan tells Muassella he expects to be investigated by the Senate re: Noriega. Mussella begins to search for a safer haven.

On June 20, Mussella is in Paris where he meets a Mr. Chinoi (sp?). He tells Chinoi who his clients; Chinoi says he knows. Musella says his clients are corporate types like Lee Iacocca, except Iacocca sells cars, Mussella's clients sell cocaine.

Sept. 9: The Senate subpoenas BCCI's Panama bank records. The pressure is on.

Hume introduces his client, Mr. Awan. Describes him: 42, Pakistani, married, two kids. Describes him as "combative, a hunter, a sportsman, likes to work with his hands. Mechanical, interested in photography." His father is a retired cop, his mother a retired college professor. Since graduating college, Awan worked four years for a bank in Pakistan and four years in London befoire joining BCCI in '78. He was country manager for Panama 81-84; stationed as a PR official in Washington, DC '84-87; and assigned to the Latin American regional office in Miami in 87. His job was to "gather deposits and increase the deposit base."

"What is Mr. Awan's motive?" asked Hume. "The government conceded he received no money, he solicited no money. My client got nothing but his salary. ... Ask yourself: Is it responsible to do this for a promotion."

* "Musella and the government deceived other banks," said Hume. "Florida National Bank sent a letter to BCCI referring to Mr. Mussella as a good customer. The trap was set by disarming the alarm of the banking system. The government gave the banking system a form of AIDS by disabling its immune system."

As a result, said Hume, "The government was able to make it easy for Mr. Mora and others to get money out of the country without the assistance of BCCI and my client (Awan)."

Hume and other defense attorneys say there was a long paper trail despite Mussella's insistence of no paper. "Mr. Awan followed procedures in terms of identifying every transaction. There are reams of paperwork. We have perfectly documented paperwork. ... My client engaged in a good faith decision."

"Historically," said HUme, "bankers have not asked where the money comes from. They don't ask that. Why? Because it embarrasses customers. It drives people away."

"This deception was sophisticated," said Hume.

"My client Mr. Awan was a W-2 employee just like you," Hume told the jurors. "A paycheck every two weeks. Deductions ... A man in debt, a man who spent more than he made. A candidate for corruption with all this money floating around. ... But the only thing Mr. Awan ever got was his salary."

After ticking off meetings Bush, Casy, North & Poindexter had with Noriega over the years, Hume asked, "What should my client have known about Mr. Noriega that the U.S. government didn't know about Mr. Noriega?"